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For about a hundred years, the states of the Middle East have been struggling with coming to 
terms with their national identity. Throughout the 20th century, these states have shed blood, 
formed unsuccessful unions and tried out different leaders and political ideologies, yet not 
much progress has been made regarding this mission. Is it because there are some unknown 
external forces that wish to partition and rule the Middle East for their benefit (as some 
demagogues would agree) or is this fragility distinctive of how the Middle Eastern nation-
state was inorganically formed and how the imposed identity of the people inherently clashed 
with their actual identities that relied on an opposing form of loyalty? This essay will argue 
for the latter. It will claim that the fragility of the Arab Middle Eastern nation-state stems 
from the underdeveloped forces of internal and external sovereignty which form the 
backbone of national imagination. After explicating the anthropological theoretical 
background of the argument, this essay will then proceed to compare the cases of Turkey, 
Iraq and Syria in how they struggled with these two modernising forces in their formative 
years. 
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2. The citizen and the space 
 
In order to critically assess the relative durability of modern Middle Eastern nation-states in 
the 20
th
 century, we first need to comprehend and contextualise what the term “modern 
nation-state” connotes, and within which socio-political context it comes to being. Nations – 
upon which nation states were built – cannot be considered as continuations of primordial 
structures that can be taken for granted and considered to have always existed. Instead, in 
order for that assumption of continuity to be constructed, there have to be the necessary 
conditions and the socio-historical foundation for “imagining” (Anderson, 1983)the nation.  
 
Although some modern nation states are still relatively contingent on the memories and 
glories of pre-modern ethnic identities and communities, most nation states, specifically those 
born in the midst of the mandate system, rely on institutionalised modes of identity-making 
for the legitimacy and the imagination of their so-called nationalism. In its essence, the nation 
is “a sociocultural artefact that creates an ethnolinguistic community, imagining itself to be 
homogeneous” (Tibi, 1990, p.13)) by the invention of tradition, commonality and fraternity. 
Therefore, for a nation to be considered durable or successful, this sense of common purpose 
and fraternity should be cultivated in such a manner that does not allow significant clashes of 
loyalty and confusion over the definition of the said nation.  
 
The main prerequisite for the nation-state can be argued to be an emotionally-fuelled 
understanding of “sovereignty”. According to Bassam Tibi, “the underlying concept of the 
nation-state is sovereignty, which not only presupposes the capability of the central power to 
establish itself over the entire territory but also requires established citizenship and 
corresponding national identity and loyalty.” (Tibi, 1990, p.147) In regards to this 
assessment, we can assert that the idea of the nation-state boils down to a dual arrangement of 
“external sovereignty” – which realises itself in the idea of territoriality and spatiality, and of 
“internal sovereignty”- which is maintained through the idea of citizenship buttressed by 
feelings and imaginations of commonality and fraternity-. This essay will add a further point 
to Tibi’s assessment and argue that a simplistic imposition of these two tenets of nationalism 
would not suffice as long as there is a significant lack of emotional connection in their 
imagination. “There is a distinction between objective markers of identity and a 
consciousness of that identity.” (Cole & Kandiyoti, 2002, p.190) For the nation-state to be 
externally and internally sovereign, its imagining of the nation must be supported by the 
emotional bonds of fraternity and spatiality of its subjects which would transform the empty 
institutions of the state to a fully-fledged imagined polity. 
 
2a. In Consideration of Space 
The idea of the space as an emotional component of nationalism plays a vital role in 
constructing the identities of the “self” and the “other”. Personal identities can be constructed 
and maintained around how does an individual relates itself to a particular spatial 
configuration and build emotional and group ties around the imagination of that space.   This 
affect is achieved by projecting the imagined fraternity of the subjects onto an objective 
physical space where the constructed community and its exteriority can be visualised. In the 
words of Akhil Gupta, national identity-making relies on cultivating “a naturalised 
association between identity and space.” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p.7)  Without a constant, 
naturalised, and institutionally and structurally established nexus of space and identity, 
forming a strong nationalism would be nearly impossible. “Nationalism is the subjective 
counterpart of the nation, a space of interiority in which the nation is conceived of as an 
aspect of the self, as well as an ideology wherein the nation is given a cobbled-together 
history, a distinctive cultural heritage, and a commonality of interest that all stop at the 
borders of the nation-state.” (Cole &. Kandiyoti, 2002, p.190) 
 
Such as in the cases of England and Australia, the criteria of common language, common 
ancestry, and common history are not sufficient enough to provide the basis for a unitary 
understanding of nation and nation-state. Despite sharing a language, a common ethnicity and 
even a shared past of heroisms and suffering (ex: the Gallipoli War), these two countries do 
not share a sense of imagined fraternity and commonality. They constitute different nations 
and are part of separate nation-states. This spatial disconnection between the countries is one 
of the ways in which a modern sense of nationalism cannot be born between the two. The 
integrity and the constancy of the territory form the backbone of the imaginations of a nation. 
One must not neglect the “importance of attaching causes to places and the ubiquity of place-
making in collective political mobilization.” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992, p.13) Creation of the 
border and its manifestation in the emotional imaginations of the civil society is, therefore, 
the first prerequisite for a successful and durable nationalism. 
 
2b. In Consideration of Citizenship 
The second condition of a sustainable nationalism was identified as the idea of “internal 
sovereignty” by Bassam Tibi. “A basic component of this internal sovereignty is the idea of 
citizenship, which presupposes transforming tribal and, in general, prenational ties into a 
national identity and loyalty.” (Tibi, 1990, p.127)  This sense of common loyalty and 
fraternity with the rest of a given community creates conditions for social functions that are 
required from a well-oiled nation-state such as industry, mobilisation and participation in the 
political process. “The modern nation is made up of citizens with an affective and 
imaginative commitment to identity with co-citizens.” (Cole &. Kandiyoti, 2002, p.190) A 
distinction should be made that this concept of commonality is not synonymous with strict 
homogeneity. A successful nation-state making and diversity is not mutually exclusive. A 
perfect example of this phenomenon would be the example of Belgium; a nation-state 
comprised of different groups speaking different languages, yet can manage to sustain an idea 
of the nation and more importantly, an idea of co-citizenship. Heterogeneity in the structural 
make-up does not necessarily pose a stumbling block towards achieving identity-based 
homogeneity. Instead, constructing an emotional connection with one’s compatriots and 
establishing the identity of “citizen” as the exclusive form of loyalty is adequate for the 
forming of an “internal sovereignty” in the nation-state. 
 
With regards to these two criteria established for the durability of a modern understanding of 
the nation and the nation-state, this essay will now proceed to compare and contrast the 
examples of Turkey, Iraq and Syria in their respective applications of these prerequisites.  
 
3. The case of Turkey as successful nation-making 
 
“Turkey is never included among those states that observers often refer to as “artificial”, like 
Iraq, Syria or Jordan, which were forged in the aftermath of World War 1.” (Cook,  9 January 
2016) Despite its deep vulnerabilities and structural problems of its own, The Republic of 
Turkey, until at least late 1970s, could be considered as a relatively more durable and 
successful example of nation-state making compared to other Middle Eastern states striving 
to form a nationality. As the official and spiritual successor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey 
had a clear-cut high culture to base its identity on and as a nation formed through an 
independence war, rather than exogenously imposed through the mandate system, it had the 
chance to form the necessary emotional connection between the space and the people. 
Regardless of the many problems that the country had with its Kurdish minorities and its 
often violent and racist methods of identity-construction, it can nevertheless be asserted that 
its conception of the nation was more in line with the definition given by Tibi; a nationalism 
with a clear understanding of its internal and external sovereignty and a people with an 
emotional bond with its territory and its co-citizens. 
 
3a. Once Upon a Time in Anatolia 
Anatolia had always played a significant part in the imagining of the Turkish nation. It was a 
political space that belonged to the Turks for almost a thousand years; it was almost lost to 
the enemy forces, and was taken back through a bloody independence war. In the post-WW1 
period, “the real threat of losing Anatolia, the centre of the Empire, in 1918 when the Allied 
and Greek forces invaded it following World War I, presented an urgent need for the 
redefinition of both the geographic borders and raison d’etre of the state.” (Saatci, 2002, 
p.553) A naturalised association of the Anatolian political space and the developing Turkish 
people, and the potential of losing this political space became the catalyst for the nation-
making function.   
 
In this discourse of “protection”, the emotional connection that is necessary for the successful 
internalization of political space is constructed via reference to the acts of suffering, and of 
“taking back the homeland”. This narrative of sacrifice and heroism for the reclamation of the 
homeland has become the main force behind the imagination of the Turkish nation, and is 
still a powerful rhetoric for the Turkish statesmen to employ for political mobilization. 
Atatürk’s famous remark “sovereignty is not given, it is taken” (Ataturk, Quotes.net, 2017), 
in its construction of sovereignty (in this case external sovereignty) as a merit is emblematic 
of this nation-making function. Collective imagination of these past sufferings is frequently 
invoked to create the aforementioned emotional connection to Anatolia and the sense of duty 
towards protecting the political space; and it is a central feature of what made Turkey, in its 
formative years, a relatively more coherent nation. 
 
3b. “How Happy Is the One Who Says I’m A Turk” 
Considering its history of structural multiculturalism and multilingualism, the successful 
creation of the “Turkish state” and “Turkey” as the loci of loyalty for a majority of the 
country was a commendable feat. Early in the 1900s, the Turanian movement and the rule of 
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in the Ottoman Empire have started to 
distinguish the ethnically-defined character of the new Turkish nation. In order to prevent any 
potential clashes of loyalty and identity, a project of break-away from the Pan-Islamist and 
Ottomanist ideologies was initiated. “We Ottomans belong to a race sufficiently intelligent 
and practical to understand that the pursuit of the Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries 
would be contrary to our dearest interests.” (Knight, 1909, p.64) The Turanian literary and 
political movement in Turkey “stirred the Turks for a national regeneration on ‘pure Turkish’ 
lines based on the natural affinities of all Turkish-speaking peoples.” (Zeine, 1981, p.77) 
Rejecting the overlapping identities prevalent in the Ottoman Empire, this new Turkish 
ideology set the path for the construction of a clear-cut understanding of Turkish citizenship. 
 
Rather than embracing the traditional multicultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Kemalist regime, following the influence of the Young Turks’ ideology, through actions such 
as the population exchange between the Greeks and the Turks and the assimilation of groups 
such as the Circassians, the Lazs, Kurds and the Alevis  strived to transform the 
heterogeneous Ottoman Empire into an ethnically-defined homogeneous nation-state. This 
project was partially successful. For instance, in the contemporary Alevi tradition, Atatürk 
(who was complicit in the execution of thousands of Alevis in the 1930s) plays as important a 
role as Ali ibn Ali Talib as a figure of loyalty. “Alongside the image of Ali, Alevi participants 
often wave Turkish flags and display photographs of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of 
the nationalist forces under the early republican regime and its paradigmatic icon. The display 
of these images reverberates with a sense of loyalty to the statist project  of secular 
nationalism.” (Tambar,  2014, p.4) Similarly, “the Circassians have also been 
comprehensively assimilated within Turkey.” (Armstrong, 7 May 2015) Barring the on-going 
problems with the Kurdish secessionist groups, it can be asserted that a comprehensive 
understanding of Turkish citizenship and of loyalty to the nation was already in place in the 
post-Ottoman Turkey. Through Ataturk’s discourse of “how happy is the one who says i’m a 
Turk”, the high culture of the Turkish nation was successfully disseminated to the marginal 
cultures of the once-Ottoman subjects and is now the foundation of the emotional bond of co-
citizenship. It has become a heterogeneous country imagining itself to be homogeneous. 
 
Ergo, one can observe that the Turkish nation of the 20
th
 century was more or less compatible 
with what Tibi described as conditions for a modern nation-state. With the role of Anatolia in 
the political imagination of the Turks, the project of disassociation from Pan-Islamism and 
Ottomanism in the CUP era, and the impact of Kemalist assimilation policies and its 
discourse of a “so-called” all-inclusive nationalism, the Turkish nation firmly established the 
emotional linkage of space and citizenship in the collective imaginations of its people. 
 
4. The cases of Syria and Iraq and the fragility of Middle Eastern 
nation-making 
 
Although by now an academic cliché, the sheer impact of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 
and the subsequent mandate rules of England and France in Iraq and Syria respectively 
should not be disregarded in how they are complicit for most of the region’s troubles with 
identity and nationalism. Nation-building in the region, rather than an organic process with a 
unifying story of “heroism”, was “the consequence of ‘mandated nationhood’ imposed on a 
colonially dominated Syria and Iraq.” (Budeiri, 1997, p.194) The exogenous imposition of 
national identity and the consequent insincerity of loyalty hindered the development of a 
national imagination corresponding to the standards proposed by Bassam Tibi. Instead, what 
transpired in Iraq and Syria can be aptly summarised as “simultaneity of the non-
simultaneous” (Bloch, 1993, p.317); a term first used by German sociologist Ernst Bloch. 
Syria and Iraq of the 20
th
 century were faced with the modernising forces of national 
institutions and colonialism but were still comprised of a people and a political tradition stuck 
in the emotional arrangements of loyalty from a century earlier. The persistency of the 
Ottoman Arab world, and its fragile replacement for an unwilling people became the source 
of the region’s problems. Insincere territorial arrangements that did not resonate with the 
people emotionally, and overlapping and clashing identities of peoples ruled by ideologically 
confused leaders were to leave the “nations” of Iraq and Syria with an on-going state of 
fragility. 
 
4a. “Given, Not Taken” 
Dissimilar to the nation-building in India and Turkey, the external sovereignty of Iraq and 
Syria were “given, not taken”. Furthermore, the giving of the political space was not subject 
to considerations of loyalty and identity, but rather arranged with political interests of the 
colonial forces in mind. Therefore, it wouldn’t be surprising to find out that an emotional 
connection between the space and the people was not constructed successfully. Paraphrasing 
Abbas Kelidar, “the political lexicon of the Arab East was clearly unable to produce an 
equivalent notion to the European concept of “state” with its dual associations of territory and 
sovereignty.” (Kelidar, 1993, p.317) 
 
Territoriality and regional borders, in the Ottoman times, were not of much significance. 
“Though the empire was sub-divided into provinces, the names, borders, dimensions and 
every other possible variable kept changing over time and though the Ottomans were fully 
aware of the terms “Iraq” and “Syria”, none ever matched the borders of a province.” 
(Gerber, 2004, pp.264-265) The provincial arrangements of the people were essentially of no 
meaning, and consequently, an emotional linkage to the space was practically non-existent. 
This legacy of non-territoriality (or trans-territoriality), when faced with an imperial 
imposition of strict borders, logically, backlashed. “Rulers were imposed on territorially 
demarcated populations as was the institutional framework by which they were to be 
governed. The source of public law was not popular sovereignty. Power and authority 
emanated from and belonged to the mandatory powers, namely Britain and France.” (Kelidar, 
1993, p.321) 
 
At the turn of the 20
th
 century, the Ottoman Vilayets and later Iraqi provinces of Baghdad, 
Basra and Mosul were the main referents of loyalty for the Iraqi people. These were “more or 
less self-sufficient communities ruled by their own forces, authorities and hierarchies” 
(Zubaida, 2002, p.205). When the new state of Iraq was set up in 1920 out of these three 
provinces, therefore, they failed in forming a uniform political identity. “The local 
allegiances and political aspirations that existed in these provinces did not disappear with the 
lines drawn in Cairo.”  (Simon, 1997, p.90) “They feared the domination of one by the others 
and their rivalry was manifested in the adoption of provincial candidates for the kingship of 
Iraq under the British mandatory.” (Kelidar, 1993, p.323) This fragmented nature of the Iraqi 
spatial arrangement naturally led to confusion over loyalties of the people and crippled the 
chances for a genuine emotional connection between the space and the people.  
 
In the French mandated Syria, a similar crisis of the space was afoot. Under the French 
Mandate, Syria was divided into four states; Damascus, Aleppo, Alawites and Jabal Druze. 
“The truncation of Syria by the French mandatory administration has left a deep impact on its 
political consciousness. The memory of its territorial diminution provided the grounds for 
bitterness and the impetus for change in the status quo.” (Kelidar, 1993, p.327) Identical to 
the Iraqi experience, the partition of the national territory by the colonial powers left the 
nation in a perplexed state of clashing identities. The semi-independent status of these 
provinces eventually prompted rivalry and an overlap of identities between the centralised 
nation and the divided sub-territories. This confusion was exacerbated by the irredentist 
sentiments of the Syrian and Iraqi leaders whose cries for Pan-Arabism added another 
dimension to the complex multi-territorial loyalty arrangements of the region. By expanding 
the territory, these nations thought they could circumvent the identity questions posed by the 
partitioned state. However, this plan proved to be unsuccessful as well. “While the Syrians 
may be discontented with the territorial delimitation of their country, the size of the state has 
proved too large for any particular community to dominate it to the total exclusion of the 
others.” (Kelidar, 1993, pp.327-328) 
 
Ergo, in regard to imaginations of external sovereignty in Iraq and Syria, one can observe that 
the lack of emotional connection between the space and the people arose out of a confusion 
over the definition of the borders and its manifestation in the people’s imagination. As the 
people of Iraq and Syria did not have a historical connection to the colonially-imposed 
borders due to the non-territorial structural arrangement of the Ottoman Empire, and as the 
new rulers of the states rather than providing a unitary and constant understanding of 
territoriality, delivered a divided and constantly-shifting understanding of political space that 
were negatively effected by their irredentist or unionist projects, the first prerequisite of 
Bassam Tibi’s conditions for nation-state formation can not be said to be fully implemented. 
 
4b. A “Tribe” Called Quest 
The understanding of citizenship in Syria and Iraq, akin to their territorial imaginations, was 
problematic due to the simultaneous existence of subnational and supranational loci of 
loyalty. The tribal history of the Arab Middle East on one hand and the universalist 
“Ummah” tradition on the other, the necessary socio-historical conditions for a focused 
identity-making on the national-level were barely there in the first place. With regards to this, 
Bassam Tibi employs the concept of simultaneity of the non-simultaneous “for 
conceptualizing the parallel existence of two social and political patterns with their social 
origins in crucially different historical periods: the old tribes and the modern nation-state.” 
(Tibi, 1990, p.127) The co-existence of these two referents of loyalty has become the source 
of the Middle Eastern nation-state crisis. 
 
“For different Iraqi groups, at the turn of the 20th century, there were a number of overlapping 
theoretical and actual entities in terms which they could imagine their inclusion.” (Zubaida, 
2002, p.205) Besides the Sunni head of the state, the Shi’I Iraq was divided into the ulama 
class, urban merchants and tribesmen each with a different political agenda and with 
overlapping spheres of influence. “The tribes of the south, mostly Shi’I, were organised in 
loose confederations headed by shaykhs who led these self-governing units that interacted 
with other tribes over control of trade routes and land.” (Simon, 1997, p.91) These self-
governing units, in defiance of the centralised government’s wish for a unified loyalty, 
maintained their role as economic and administrative bases for many Iraqis, and subsequently 
their function as a referent of loyalty in the country with their traditional kinship ties 
trumping over the artificially-imposed fraternity of the nation-state. In the words of C.J. 
Edmonds in his report to the British Office in 1931; “The government was inevitably in the 
hands of a limited oligarchy composed of essentially Sunni townsmen representing only a 
small minority of country. It was easy for any agitator to play upon the religious, racial or 
personal prejudices of anyone who is not an Arab, a Muslim or is a Muslim but not a Sunni.” 
(Edmonds, 1931) The state mechanism, in the modern nation-state, has a responsibility to 
create a unified identity of “citizenship” for the imagination of its “internal sovereignty”. 
According to Elie Kedourie, “the nation state is distinguished by one crucial factor, namely 
that of popular sovereignty which serves as the source of all political authority in a specific 
territory where the totality of the citizens constitutes the sovereign people.” (Kedourie, 1987, 
pp.1-9) When the state fails to become the source of popular sovereignty and simultaneously 
coexists with an ancient form of polity acting as a clashing locus of loyalty, a nationalist 
conception of “internal sovereignty” naturally becomes a problematic issue. 
 
Similarly, in Syria, efforts of establishing an ethnically-defined Arab nation-state faced a 
tremendous amount of resistance from the persisting tribal structures of Alawites. In the 
formative days of the Syrian nation-state, Alawites were subdivided into four main tribes; 
Matawira, Haddadin, Khayyatin and Kalbiyya. When the kinsmen of Matawira advanced to 
the ruling elite and started recruiting exclusively their tribesmen, a disconnection between the 
elite and the people occurred. (Tibi, 1990, p.139) In this crisis of legitimacy, tribes emerged 
as the primary referent of identity. According to Bassam Tibi, autonomy was the major trait 
of the tribal structure “which explains why tribes stood in opposition to the state as a central 
monopoliser of power and why they resisted being subdued by it.” (Tibi, 1990, p.140) When 
the state turned into a mechanism exclusively favouring the Matawira tribe, the people’s 
loyalties logically followed their respective tribes. Consequently, the state-imposed 
nationalism did not resonate with the people and tribal kinship became a more powerful 
source of loyalty than the imagined identity of “citizen.” State’s failure to disseminate a high 
culture led to the restoration of an old form of loyalty, that of tribalism. In this sense, 
corresponding to Ernst Bloch’s theory, a simultaneity of the non-simultaneous occurred.  
 
Then, compared to Turkish nationalism’s successful assimilation of various loci of loyalty, 
we observe in Iraq and Syria, in their formative years, a simultaneity of multiple structures 
belonging to separate historical eras. The persistence of tribal structures in becoming people’s 
primary source of identity, exacerbated by the failed assimilation policies of the state leaders 
(whose loyalties lied elsewhere) resulted in an inadequate adoption of the Tibian 
understanding of “internal sovereignty.” A focused and inclusive concept of the “citizen” 




The fragility of the Iraqi and Syrian nationalisms in the 20
th
 century stem from a distinct 
failure to adopt the two necessary conditions for a successful nationalism; a naturalised 
association of the people and the national space, and a focused sense of commonality and 
loyalty. In countries such as Turkey, the socio-historical foundation of the nation (such as the 
emotional and historical ties with the Anatolian space) and state policies adopted by the 
nationalist elite (disassociation from Pan-Islamism and assimilation of ethnic minorities) 
produced the conditions for a relatively favourable imagination of a nation. The Iraqi-Syrian 
nation-state making, on the other hand, encountered two distinctive impediments for their 
national imagination. First, the underdeveloped emotional ties with the political space which 
was exogenously imposed on these nations by the mandate powers precluded a naturalised 
association of the people and the national space. Secondly, the persistence of tribal loyalty 
arrangements in the region, combined with the favouritism of the state institutions, resulted in 
overlapping and clashing loci of loyalty travelling back and forth between the state and the 
tribe. In consideration of this inadequacy in implementing the aforementioned prerequisites 
for imagining a nation, perhaps one should ask; will the idea of the nation-state ever be 
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